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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v, 
PETER VICTOR MONTOYA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010458SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This is an appeal from convictions for one count of murder, 
a first degree felony, and two counts of attempted murder, a 
second degree felony. This Court has jurisdiction over the 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion by denying 
defendant's motion for a new trial where the court determined 
that defendant's "newly-discovered" evidence could have been 
discovered before trial with reasonable diligence and where, in 
any event, the evidence was inadmissible hearsay? 
"[T]he decision to grant or deny a new trial is a matter of 
discretion with the trial court and will not be reversed absent a 
clear abuse of discretion." State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 
1 
(Utah 1985) (citation omitted); 'accord State v. Martin, 1999 UT 
72, 55, 984 P.2d 975 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 
P.2d 937, 940 (Utah 1993)). 
2. Was defendant's trial counsel constitutionally 
ineffective when, for strategic reasons, he did not pursue two 
witnesses whose testimony, had it been timely discovered, would 
nonetheless have been inadmissible? 
In reviewing a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, 
this Court must determine whether trial counsel's performance was 
deficient and, if so, whether the deficient performance 
prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687 (1984). The claim presents a question of law, reviewed on 
the available record of the underlying proceedings. State v. 
Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 1 26, 12 P.3d 92, 101. 
3. Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion for 
a directed verdict where the State adduced believable evidence 
that defendant fired the shot that killed the victim? 
"When reviewing any challenge to a trial court's denial of a 
motion for directed verdict, we review *the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that may fairly be drawn therefrom in the 
light most favorable to the party moved against, and will sustain 
the denial if reasonable minds could disagree with the ground 
asserted for directing a verdict.'" Mahmood v. Ross, 1999 UT 104, 
116, 990 P.2d 933 (citations omitted); accord Cook Associates, 
2 
Inc. v. Warnick, 664 P.2d 1161, 1165 (Utah 1983). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
No constitutional provision, statute, or rule is 
dispositive. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Following a shooting, defendant was charged by information 
with one count of murder and two counts of attempted murder (R. 
3-5). At trial, after the State presented its case-in-chief, 
defendant moved for a directed verdict (R. 386: 32). The court 
deferred consideration of the motion until the trial concluded, 
and defendant presented his case. Following all the evidence, 
defendant moved to dismiss (Id. at 42). The court took the 
motion under advisement (Id. at 59). 
A jury convicted defendant as charged (R. 242-44). At a 
subsequent hearing, the trial court considered and then denied 
defendants' motions for a directed verdict and to dismiss (R. 
387: 37-39 or addendum A). 
The court sentenced defendant to five years to life on the 
first degree felony and one-to-fifteen years on each of the 
second degree felonies. The court also imposed one-year firearm 
enhancements on each count and ordered all three sentences to run 
consecutively (R. 271-73). Finally, the court imposed fines, 
fees, and restitution (Id.). 
Defendant moved for a new trial (R. 275). Following a 
3 
hearing, the court denied the motion (R. 347-52 or addendum B; R. 
357-61 or addendum C)• Defendant then filed this timely appeal 
(R. 363). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Late on a May night in 1997, Kelly Seal, age 16, drove his 
15-year-old brother, Matt, and his 19-year-old friend, Greg, to 
Beck Street to watch drag races (R. 384: 24-25). Greg described 
the outing as "heading out to have fun in the night with guys, 
heading out cruising the streets, picking up girls, going to see 
vehicles" (R. 385: 43). 
In the course of the evening, the boys stopped at a 
combination Amoco station and Rainbo Mart on Beck Street to buy 
drinks and use the restroom (R. 384: 27, 29). There, they ran 
into a friend of Greg's and so stopped to talk with him and 
admire his vehicle (R. 384: 29-30; R. 385: 58). While they were 
so engaged, Matt's attention was diverted by a red, four-by-four, 
stick shift, GMC king cab truck whose driver, Russell Thornwall, 
"squealed the tires" while backing up to change the position of 
the truck relative to the gas pumps1 (R. 384: 31-32, 49, 70, 85). 
Glancing over moments later, Matt saw Thornwall get out of the 
truck and begin pumping gas (Id. at 32). Matt testified that he 
remembered Thornwall "throwing up his hands" and yelling, "VLT," 
1
 Thornwall had apparently pulled up on the wrong side of 
the gas pumps, given the location of the truck's gas tank (R. 
384: 72-74; R. 385: 111). 
4 
which Matt knew was a gang reference (Id. at 33-34). The boys 
tried to ignore the apparent threat and soon got back in their 
car and left the gas station (Id. at 35).2 
As the boys started to drive back to the races, Kelly 
received a page or realized that he had forgotten to return a 
page (R. 384: 36, 48; R. 385: 57, 60, 98). Either way, the boys 
returned to the Amoco/Rainbo Mart to use the telephone (R. 385: 
60). Kelly pulled the Honda Civic up to the pay phones, located 
about twenty feet from the Rainbo Mart, and approached the phone, 
where he was joined by Greg (R. 384: 26, 36-37, 48; R. 385: 61). 
Matt could hear Thornwall still yelling and so stayed in the car, 
seated in the middle of the back seat, avoiding any contact with 
him (R. 384: 38, 81). Greg, standing by the phones, made eye 
contact with Thornwall as he was pumping gas. Thornwall threw 
his hands up in the air in a "what are you looking at type 
gesture" (R. 385: 63). Greg, feeling threatened by the man's 
apparent anger and aggressiveness, urged Kelly to get off the 
phone (IcL_ at 63-64, 98-99). 
Kelly and Greg returned to the Honda. By this time, 
Thornwall had moved the red truck from the gas pumps and driven 
2
 The parties stipulated that the driver of the truck was 
Russell Thornwall (R. 385: 82). Days before the preliminary 
hearing in this case, Thornwall became the subject of a felony 
stop. Fleeing the police, Thornwall fired multiple rounds at an 
officer, then ran behind a building and shot himself fatally in 
the head (Id^at 136-38). 
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around behind the boys' vehicle, stopping "a couple of car 
lengths" away (R. 384: 39, 49, 83; R. 385: 64). Thornwall revved 
the engine (R. 384: 83-84; R. 385: 61). Matt quickly glanced 
back from the middle of the back seat and saw both Thornwall and 
a middle passenger in the truck.3 Matt also noticed that the 
front passenger side door was open (R. 384: 39-40, 87). When he 
glanced back a second time, he saw defendant, who had just left 
the Rainbo Mart, walk past the back of the Honda, get into the 
truck, and close the door (Id. at 40, 42-43, 83-86). 
The boys all had the same thought - to leave (Id. at 44). 
Kelly backed the Honda up and then drove parallel to the front of 
the Rainbo Mart on his way towards the Beck Street exit (R. 384: 
44, 49-50; R. 385: 67). The red truck followed, coming up along 
the right side of the Honda and then swerving towards it (R. 384: 
44, 51; R. 385: 6, 67). Kelly quickly responded to prevent a 
collision (R. 384: 44; R. 385: 67, 99). At this juncture, both 
Thornwall and defendant, who was leaning over Thornwall from the 
passenger side and staring intently at the Honda, were repeatedly 
yelling "VLT" and "pussies" at the boys (R. 384: 45, 51, 57; R. 
385: 31, 67-68, 100). 
Kelly approached the exit, with the truck following closely 
3
 Matt described the middle passenger as Hispanic, with a 
shaved head (R. 384: 86). He was unsure whether the passenger 
was sitting in the front or back seat of the truck (R. 384: 86-
87; R. 385: 12). In any event, the man remained unidentified and 
did not testify at trial. 
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behind, its lights shining through the Honda's back window into 
the smaller and lower vehicle (R. 384: 52-53; R. 385: 69, 80, 
103). The Honda came to a "rolling stop" to cross a dip in the 
driveway and was just beginning to turn left onto Beck Street 
when Matt and Greg heard shots (R. 384: 54; R. 385: 89, 103). 
The back window shattered, and the red truck raced off to the 
right, tires squealing, traveling south on Beck Street at high 
speed (R. 384: 54-55, 60; R. 385: 74, 103; R. 386: 35). Matt 
heard somebody shout, "VLT rules!" (R. 384: 60). 
The Honda rolled to a stop in the middle of Beck Street (R. 
384: 55; R. 385: 73). Kelly was bleeding from the nose and 
throat, coughing up blood (R. 384: 59; R. 385: 71). He died of a 
single gunshot wound to the back of the head (R. 385: 48). Greg 
was shot in the lower right back but recovered (R. 384: 63; R. 
385: 70). Matt was physically unharmed (R. 384: 55-56). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its 
discretion in denying his motion for a new trial because newly-
discovered evidence established that Russell Thornwall, rather 
than defendant, was the shooter. This argument fails because the 
allegedly exculpatory statements could have been discovered with 
reasonable diligence before trial. 
Defendant offered the testimony of a detective, who had 
spoken with a confidential witness who claimed to be the front 
7 
right passenger in the truck, the only living eyewitness to the 
shootings other than defendant. The confidential witness could 
have been discovered with reasonable diligence if defendant had 
simply called upon the court to subpoena the witness's 
uncooperative mother for further information concerning his 
whereabouts. 
Defendant also offered the testimony of Jason Thornwall, 
Russell's brother and close confidant. Russell died just before 
the preliminary hearing. Knowing that Russell's death might open 
up previously-closed channels of communication and that more time 
might lead to the discovery of potentially exculpatory 
information, defendant not only did not so inform the court, but 
also vigorously opposed the State's request for a trial 
continuance. Had defendant sought the continuance and pursued 
Russell's family with reasonable diligence, Jason would have come 
to light as Russell's only sibling and the person he most 
trusted. 
In any event, the "newly-discovered" testimony was 
inadmissible and so could not have altered the outcome of 
defendant's trial. First, the statement of the confidential 
witness did not qualify for any hearsay exception because he was 
not legally unavailable and his statement did not qualify as a 
hearsay exception. The statement was offered for the truth of 
the matter asserted yet wholly lacked trustworthiness because it 
8 
was neither made under oath nor subject to cross-examination. 
Further, the identity of the witness was never revealed to the 
court. Second, Russell Thornwall's statement to his brother, 
while potentially subject to a hearsay objection, bore no indicia 
of reliability. Additionally, the credibility of the statement 
was fatally undermined by Jason's substantial and unexplained 
delay in reporting it. For these reasons, the trial court did 
not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new 
trial. 
Defendant next asserts ineffective assistance of counsel, 
arguing that: 1) if the testimony could have been produced with 
reasonable diligence at trial, then his counsel performed 
deficiently by failing to discover it; and 2) he was prejudiced 
because the statements likely would have produced a different 
trial outcome. Counsel will only be found to have performed 
deficiently when "no conceivable legitimate tactic or strategy 
can be surmised from counsel's action." State v. Tennyson/ 850 
P.2d 461, 468 (Utah App. 1993). Here, defendant strategically 
chose to try his case based primarily on circumstantial evidence 
that he reasonably believed was sufficient for him to prevail and 
that did not involve the risk of producing a potentially adverse 
witness. In any event, because the statements of both the 
confidential witness and of Jason Thornwall were inadmissible, 
they could not affect the outcome of the case. 
9 
Finally, defendant argues that the trial court erred in 
denying his motion for a directed verdict. He contends that the 
evidence was so inconclusive that reasonable minds must have 
entertained a reasonable doubt that he was the shooter. The 
evidence, however, was amenable to two interpretations, and the 
jury chose to accept the State's interpretation over defendant's. 
Because this choice reflects on the weight of the evidence rather 
than its legal sufficiency, the trial court did not err in 
denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS 
DISCRETION BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WHERE THE 
PROPOSED TESTIMONY COULD HAVE BEEN 
DISCOVERED PRIOR TO TRIAL WITH 
REASONABLE DILIGENCE AND WHERE THE 
TESTIMONY WAS INADMISSIBLE AND SO 
COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE OUTCOME 
OF THE TRIAL 
Defendant asserts that the court should have granted him a 
new trial on the grounds of newly-discovered evidence. 
Specifically, he asserts that information provided by two 
individuals - the first, a confidential witness who claimed to be 
the right front passenger in the truck and the second, Russell 
Thornwall's brother and confidant, Jason - would have established 
that Russell Thornwall, rather than defendant, was the shooter 
(Br. of Aplt. at 22-23; R. 276-80). 
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A trial court may grant a new trial in the interest of 
justice if there was any impropriety in the initial trial that 
had a substantially adverse effect on the rights of a party. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). For defendant to prevail on a motion for 
new trial based on newly-discovered evidence, his evidence must 
meet three criteria: 
(1) It must be such as could not with 
reasonable diligence have been discovered and 
produced at trial; 
(2) It must not be merely cumulative; 
(3) It must be such as to render a different 
result probable on the retrial of the case. 
State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991); accord State v. 
Loose, 2000 UT 11, 1 16, 994 P.2d 1237. Notably, XM[n]ew 
evidence' is not evidence which was available to defendant but 
not obtained by him prior to the time of trial. Nor is it 
evidence that he knew about or could have discovered prior to 
trial." State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 222 (Utah 
1985) (citations omitted). In reviewing a trial court's decision 
to deny a motion for new trial, this Court "presume[s] that the 
discretion of the trial court was properly exercised unless the 
record clearly shows the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman, 685 P.2d 
530, 534-35 (Utah 1984) (citation omitted). To constitute an 
abuse of discretion, the trial court's determination must be 
"beyond the limits of reasonability." State v. Hamilton, 827 
P.2d 232, 239-40 (Utah 1992). 
Here, following a hearing at which both Jason Thornwall and 
11 
a detective who had spoken to the unnamed confidential witness 
testified, the trial court concluded that neither the first nor 
third criteria for prevailing on a new trial motion based on 
newly-discovered evidence had been met (R. 347-51 at addendum B; 
R. 357-61 at addendum C). 
First, the trial court determined that defendant had not 
exercised reasonable diligence in pursuing discovery. Indeed, 
the court noted, "the defense had a number of options in pursuing 
the discovery of the confidential witness and Mr. Thornwall, but 
failed to exercise them" (R. 348 at addendum A) .4 (R. 348) . 
Second, the trial court determined that even if the evidence 
had been discovered in a timely fashion, it was inadmissible and 
so could not have rendered a different result probable on retrial 
(R. 349, 360-61). The confidential witness, by failing to 
establish that he was legally "unavailable," could not fit within 
a hearsay exception pursuant to rule 804 (R. 349-50, 360). And 
Jason Thornwall's testimony, while potentially falling within the 
hearsay exception for statements against interest, was also 
4
 The court particularly noted that when the State 
requested a continuance, defendant had not acquiesced to use the 
time for further discovery, but instead had vehemently opposed 
the motion (R. 348). Defendant argued that a continuation would 
have been futile because all avenues of investigation had been 
pursued. The court disagreed, noting that the defense could have 
sought the court's assistance in compelling the confidential 
witness's mother to be deposed under oath and that Jason 
Thornwall, Russell's only sibling, "would have been a natural 
source of investigation" (R. 348-49 at addendum B). 
12 
ultimately inadmissible because it lacked any indicia of 
substantive trustworthiness (R. 350-51, 360). 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in so ruling. 
A. No Reasonable Diligence 
The evidence supports the trial court's ruling that, by 
exercising reasonable diligence, defendant could have discovered 
the evidence before trial. As to the confidential witness, 
defendant plainly knew his identity from the outset. They were, 
after all, together in the red truck at the time of the shooting. 
Indeed, the confidential witness was the only living person, 
other than defendant, who knew exactly what happened that night. 
From defendant's perspective, if Russell Thornwall was 
indeed the shooter, then the confidential witness would have been 
a critical exculpatory witness for defendant. The witness could 
have provided direct evidence that Thornwall was the shooter and, 
by so doing, significantly strengthened defendant's likelihood of 
prevailing in what was otherwise a primarily circumstantial case. 
And if the confidential witness was himself the shooter, 
defendant's best interest would plainly have been served by 
pursuing him with the utmost aggressiveness. If, however, 
defendant was the shooter, then it would have been in defendant's 
best interest for the confidential witness - the only other 
living eyewitness to the murder - not to be located before trial. 
Defense counsel had spoken to the confidential witness's 
13 
mother on several occasions and reported to the court that "[t]he 
mother stated to us that she would not tell us - or she stated I 
don't know where he lives, I will try to get a message to him for 
you, that sort of thing, that he is out of the state, and he has 
put all of this behind him, and he is not part of that anymore" 
(R. 388: 20). Given the uncooperative nature of the witness's 
mother, defendant had two choices - either ask the court to 
subpoena the mother for a deposition under oath to ascertain more 
about the confidential witness's whereabouts, or forego pursuit 
of the witness. Where the witness might well implicate defendant 
and where defendant had developed a viable defense based on 
circumstantial evidence, he did not further pursue the witness. 
This conduct, however, does not preclude the likelihood that 
defendant, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered and 
produced the witness before trial, had defendant thought it was 
in his best interest to do so. 
The record also supports the trial court's determination 
that defendant, with reasonable diligence, could have discovered 
the testimony of Jason Thornwall before trial. Jason testified 
at the hearing on the new trial motion that he talked with 
Russell daily, that they were close friends, that he often bailed 
Russell out when Russell ran into trouble with the law, and that 
"everybody knows" that he was the only person Russell trusted (R. 
388: 75-79). 
14 
According to defense counsel, who was not assigned to the 
•v..~ • 1 late September, Russell Thornwa1 - family had not; 
oeen urr subject of extensive investigate-..
 t - - ^ 1 
(Id. ^ in-ii " .; ,on -ussell Thornwall died, counsel 
contacted r_:i„ . _.: _ 'pit^ 1 
re determine :r he had r^iv helpful information : leads (Id. at 
• • •
 r
 iri incommunicado 
until November, O m * .'• November, ju^t after tne trial 
-
]
 -
 ]
 ii'i u~ provide defense c^'m^l i-Hth the name that led 
lie contao; A. i ,i Jason i^^..,ji, A^I t:,- .:3Lt:^ii; ii 
here (Id. =>r 
- a 
investigated ^.1 that Thornwall's deatr mi .t open up channels of 
:f=-f-r,d-:r * cnuse 
i: > T O interna r .- -.i* \ i'hornwaLi .b counsel was temporarily 
-ie or Liiat he —--* K - ^ informatics. Instead, 
M;U;I ~. -K^n« -H0 proceed d^ie^, . , *._ :, . J; . I..U.'J-/ oppos-\- a 
moti^n hv t-h^  ^at-p that w.-^id nave given m m the time necessary 
choice, however, does not alter the tact that, witn reasonable 
:^n> ••.-••-•ace to the State's motion, he ^~^ld 
have garnereu ine Lime iiecessary t~ discover Jason Thornwa^ .; 
testimony before trial began. 
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B. Different Result Not Probable On Retrial 
The trial court also correctly determined that even if the 
testimony of both witnesses had been discovered before trial, it 
was inadmissible and so could not have made any difference to the 
outcome of defendant's trial. 
From the outset, the statement of the confidential witness 
failed to meet the threshold requirement for qualifying as an 
exception to the hearsay rule. That is, the declarant of the 
statement, the confidential witness, was not "unavailable as a 
witness," as that term is used in the evidentiary rule governing 
hearsay exceptions. See Utah R. Evid. 804(a).5 A witness will 
not be declared unavailable simply because his counsel asserts, 
as he did here, that the witness was "frightened to come forward" 
(R. 278). See, e.g.. State v. White, 671 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1983)(attorney for a witness cannot claim privilege against self-
incrimination; witness must appear and claim privilege personally 
in order to be declared unavailable pursuant to evidentiary 
rule). 
Because the confidential witness did not meet the threshold 
The subcategories of rule 804 (a) all require some 
interaction between the declarant and the court or judicial 
process in order to establish the "unavailability" of the witness 
for purposes of the rule. The single exception is the 
subcategory that renders legally unavailable one who "is unable 
to be present or to testify at the hearing because of death or 
then existing physical or mental illness or infirmity." Utah R. 
Evid. 804 (a) (4) . 
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requirement of unavailability as a witness, nis testimony cannot 
fa1. ] --*-vw, the amb I r M 'Me except inns outlined • rule 804, 
iriGu-j, - ^ statement; is p~:_. J. ;:' .-. , •• _i:
 J# : . • • ite 
trnt-f r>r "he matter asserted, but wholly lacking 
•- ' ~:I: :i i ior 
subject to cross-examination. See, e.g., State v. Sibert, 310 
P. 2d 388 390 (I J.t : : .1 ] 957) (e.xp] a\-:- -. essential purposes of 
hearsay rule). 
Jason Thornwa! IV- statement that Russell told '"im chat 
defendant was i . . :..JT something i-.u^ -e- . :0 
inadmissible- Although Russell Thornwall's death rendered him 
be admitted it : * fell witu:r an exception to trie hearsay rule. 
-> w • • •:*-.-.-nt -gainst interest, 
proviaes: 
(3) Statement against interest. i \ statement 
which at the time of its making 
so far tended to subject the declarant to . . 
. criminal liability, . . . that a reasonable 
person in the declarant's position would not 
have made the statement unless believing it 
to be true. A statement tending to expose 
the declarant to criminal liability and 
offered to exculpate the accused is not 
admissible unless corroborating circumstaiices 
clearly indicate the trustworthiness of the 
statement. 
statement to , • ->> arguably qualities as a statement against 
interest insofar as the statement, when it was made, might have 
17 
subjected Russell to criminal liability if Jason revealed it. 
Nonetheless, Russell's statement to Jason is rendered 
inadmissible by the last requirement of the subsection. That is, 
"corroborating circumstances clearly indicating] the 
trustworthiness of the statement" are wholly absent. Indeed, the 
delay surrounding the statement demonstrably undermines its 
credibility. 
According to Jason's affidavit and testimony at the new 
trial hearing, Russell told him that "[defendant] is in jail for 
something I did" (R. 388: 71; R. 288-89). Russell made his 
alleged statement to Jason in August or September of 1999. Yet 
Jason did not come forward with the statement until some fourteen 
months later, remaining silent after his brother's death and 
through the trial, conviction, and imprisonment of his brother's 
close friend. 
Part of the delay in reporting is understandable. That is, 
Jason would have been unlikely to come forward with information 
incriminating his brother out of familial loyalty while his 
brother was still alive and subject to criminal prosecution. 
Once Russell died, however, Jason had no reason to protect him, 
especially at the direct expense of defendant, who had been 
Russell's close friend for 10 years (R. 388: 75-76). 
In his testimony at the new trial hearing, Jason stated 
emphatically that he contacted defendant's counsel because "I 
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didn'*- want anybody paying time for »nat mv ^rotnei i^l It 
is r.r^ fair f~ v somebody to sp^nd their whole life :n orison f~r 
sometning my , .otne: . : . i - • 
b e l i e v e d this ' .*' ; -. life" (Id. at 7 9) Wl len the court asked 
Ja - : 1: 1 = po ] i ::e a f t e r Ri i s s e'. 
them, that defendant had been charged with .a crime he didr i't 
i " -j"" i----1-•-d . offering no explanation and merely 
saying,. "I got really depressed when he died. I d^n I know, your 
Honor" (Id^ at 94). 
This substantia^ ai:a L.I-•_-•.[-- i-i . * ; . J 
would have been exculpatory information defeats the requirement 
trustworthiness of a hearsay statement against interest :i\ ^rder 
nere • prohibition Jason ~™ T h3rTo 
leiL duuut approaching the police w^ih incriminating xr.iwiiTuit-L.on 
about hi c brother' Q -tateme n r ' r r-:i • *^f-n Russell dien v^t 
Jason _ „t^i_:.._.j i _*_:i- . -^ g MU / 
surfaced ir. January of 2001, fourteen months after . *' was 
- • - • i 
after defendant was convicted. Because trie testimony bear^ r.c 
indicia of tr,rt-worhhi.rrtPr f"he trial c^ur* correctly determined 
that +• was i^aamissiL^ ~u..«, accora.i.^
 2 , ..a :.::. .utuse its 
discretion in denying defendant's motion for a new trial. 
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POINT TWO 
DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL CLAIM FAILS BECAUSE HE 
STRATEGICALLY CHOSE NOT TO 
AGGRESSIVELY PURSUE EITHER THE 
CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS OR LEADS 
RELATED TO RUSSELL THORNWALL AND 
BECAUSE THE INADMISSIBLE TESTIMONY 
COULD NOT HAVE AFFECTED THE OUTCOME 
OF HIS TRIAL 
Defendant alleges that if the testimony of the confidential 
witness and of Jason Thornwall could have been produced with 
reasonable efforts prior to trial, then his counsel performed 
deficiently by failing to exercise reasonable diligence in 
discovering it (Br. of Aplt. at 26). He further contends that he 
was prejudiced by this deficient performance because the 
testimony would likely have produced a different trial outcome 
(Id. at 29-30). 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, 
defendant must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was so 
deficient as to fall below an objective standard of 
reasonableness and that, but for the deficient performance, a 
reasonable probability existed that the outcome of the trial 
would have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 4 66 U.S. 
668, 694 (1984); State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186-87 (Utah 
1990). In this case, defendant's claims fails on both prongs of 
the ineffectiveness analysis. 
First, as to deficient performance, when reviewing trial 
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counsel/s performance, "a[n appellate] court must indulge a 
s' t* : -u counsel's conduct fall0 ••.'*rh-:n ^b^ wide 
rang*- oi reasonable professioiicn assistance. State v. Taylor, 
9A"> " " i "C1 - -' ' j' • Tinti no Strickland v. Washington, 
4 , . -• _ . n^  .- .is i ujibt'i s 
performance can be articulated [this Court! will assume counsel 
u-.. -
 t — * , >.a.^ . . r^niiyo^. 16] 168 (( Jt .ah 
App. 1993 .^effective assistance claim, succeeds only 
<: • -- • ^  rt-lcs or strategy can be 
surmised from counsel's actions." Id. 
Here, defendant/ s conduct bespeaks a rationa 1 trial strategy 
that Li.ij Jw,..„
 4 no pos..i.,j, t-n second gues:- . :SL, 
defense r-n\]r\^? ^hosp nM ; : -;r---ue -he confidential witness's 
and whose deposition could have been compelled h\ the trial 
Counsel's 
silence on the matter strongly sugge^t^ ttiai he suspected the 
confidential v;:*-^ *^? w^:1ri provide tes^imon^' damaqinn t--
def en^a;:: , rat:^i Li.a:. ;.._- r:\ * •  r : •;. _ . _, :• . -. / 
that Russell Thornwall was the shooter therefore, 
evidence, which he reasonably r.;' miscaKeniy believea wuuid 
n i- i ~urr: 'ienL bdbib iui acauittal. 
Second, twelve days befoxe trial was scheduled to begin, the 
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State moved for a continuance (R. 388: 14, 38). Rather than 
stipulating to the continuance to gain time for additional 
investigation, defendant vigorously opposed the motion, 
apparently anxious to go to trial at the earliest possible date. 
In trying to explain why he did not accede to the continuance in 
order to further pursue the confidential witness, counsel offered 
that "we had no idea what [the witness] was going to say" (R. 388 
at 20). 
Realistically, the confidential witness could have testified 
in only one of three ways: he could invoke his privilege against 
self-incrimination; he could testify that Russell Thornwall was 
the shooter; or he could testify that defendant was the shooter. 
Counsel's vigorous opposition to the motion, coupled with the 
limited nature of his efforts to locate the only other eyewitness 
to the shooting, together suggest an intentional choice to 
proceed in the confidential witness's absence as a matter of 
trial strategy. See Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 470 (citing 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694); State v. Pascual, 804 P.2d 553, 
556 (Utah App. 1991)(in context of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, appellate court will not second guess legitimate trial 
strategy). 
Similarly, defendant's choice to proceed to trial 
immediately rather than to use the State's continuance request as 
an opportunity to further investigate leads from Russell 
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Thornwal"' - attorney suggests that defendant was confident in his 
4
'-•" -hooter. Having decided on that 
strategy and oeiievmy tudi the physical evidence established a 
convincing circumstantial case, he saw i io reason to pursue the 
matter further. 
Second, ^c •'^ prejudice*, the statements of the confidential 
witness and -: • — L-^L^, .- :-
been discussed at length ir. Point One. Consequently/ the 
evidence could njt affect the outcome ot tne case. For these 
^~ - - .
 mr^T i ,r * ' --.effective assistance of counsel claim 
necessarily f a n s . 
INT THREE 
THE TRIAL U U U K X LUKK^UII,! DENIr > 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIREClnu 
VERDICT BECAUSE THE STATE HAD 
PRODUCED BELIEVABLE EVIDENCE THAT , 
HE WAS TP P ^nr^rppp 
Defendant argues that t. r.e evidence th :l he was the shooter 
entertained a 
r e a s o n a b l e d o u b t t r i d t ii<= w i r- ' L ' j i . i i U i v i \u U ci - w i i O £> hot Kel~ y .,.-._l 
( B r . o f A p l t . a t ;<! -^L, ^ . " ) . h 
6
 Additionally, defei: idai it argues for the firs.- La.:ae on 
appeal that, even if the evidence sufficed to establish that he 
was the shooter, no evidence supported his intent to kill either 
of the passengers (Br. of Aplt. at 37). However, "[w]ith limited 
exceptions, the practice of this court has been to decline 
consideration of issues raised for the first time on appeal." 
Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ., 7 97 P.2d 412, 413 (Utah 
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"When a motion for a directed verdict is made at the close 
of the State's case, the trial court should dismiss the charge if 
the State did not establish a prima facie case against the 
defendant by producing 'believable evidence of all the elements 
of the crime charged.'" State v. Emmett, 839 P.2d 781, 784 (Utah 
1992) (quoting State v. Smith, 675 P.2d 521, 524 (Utah 1983)). 
If, however, "'the jury acting fairly and reasonably could find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, the judge is 
required to submit the case to the jury for determination of the 
guilt or innocence of defendant.'" State v. Taylor, 884 P.2d 
1293, 1296 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Iverson, 10 Utah 2d 
171, 350 P.2d 152, 153 (I960)). In evaluating a motion for 
directed verdict, the trial court views the evidence and all 
reasonable inferences that can be drawn from it in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. Merino v. Albertson's, Inc., 
1999 UT 14, 1 3, 975 P.2d 467. 
In this case, after a hearing, the trial court denied 
defendant's motion, stating: 
It would have been better if we had somebody 
that said [defendant] fired the gun, or 
[defendant] didn't fire the gun. Well, sure. 
1990). Absent exceptional circumstances or plain error, neither 
of which defendant has asserted here, he has waived consideration 
of whether the State made a prima facie showing of his intent to 
kill the two passengers. See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 
1229 n.5 (Utah 1995)(declining to address defendant's unpreserved 
claims, where defendant asserted neither plain error nor 
exceptional circumstances on appeal). 
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But circumstantial evidence is a reasonable 
method of proof, and that's what this case 
was. As far as who actually fired the 
weapon, it was a circumstantial case. 
And as you look a t tl: le evidence, particularly 
in the view of the way the State chooses to 
present i t, it's just as logical, if not more 
logical, that [defendant] fi red the weapon as 
Mr. Thornwall. So I can't dismiss the case 
nor can I grant the directed verdict 01 i tl: le 
state of the evidence, and I decline to do 
so The moti on is denied :i n 1 ts entirety. 
38 7 at 3 9 or addendum A) . • 
:: : i I::i : 1: i o 1:e :i [ I ] f the State is r^ ~I: i r P i + ^  put 
• in i ,„ particularly in a circumstantial case con^i^sive 
evidence of the shooter, unless you have an eyewit^e?- then 
nobody is ever going to be con victed of ki ] ] ii ig someoi ie e 1 se i: i::i I:h 
a h a n d g u n " ^ < ~< •* • The trial court's a s s e s s m e n t is 
correct : . . . .<• 
living person identified b. 'he State *• - . •• * r ^CK, ST* 
. •- * ' ^
 r
~ - nose 
not ' , i e s t i t ; " e v e a i t n e LueriLiLy . : ,it- : ; u i u p e r s o n 
/ijjser * "•" • " "ewi tnes s . t h e F* i t e n e c e s s a r i l y r e l i e d 
<-u . i - r c u m s t a n t i a l e v x ^ e i ^ t Lw c b t a L ^ ^ : . ^ i j r j a . . . - . : e 
i - f i^thin •. n such an approac > n v i c t i o n s can be 
, i , i j , S t a t e J , 
Brown, -i:ii_: :ng aggravated murder 
" stdiitial evidence) : Statue 
v. Clayton, cm- t . i < 1i 'iffirming second degree 
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murder conviction based on circumstantial evidence); State v. 
John, 586 P.2d 410, 411 (Utah 1978)(affirming manslaughter 
conviction where only circumstantial evidence pointed to 
defendant). 
During its case-in-chief, the State adduced believable, 
evidence that defendant was the shooter. The evidence was 
undisputed that Russell Thornwall initiated the fatal encounter, 
that he was driving the truck, that the truck's stick shift was 
located to Russell's right, and that Russell was right-handed. 
In addition, the evidence was uncontroverted that defendant was a 
front seat passenger in the truck at the time of the shooting, 
that defendant was leaned over Thornwall to shout threats at the 
victims, and that the shots were fired from the truck (R. 384 at 
33, 40, 45, 54, 57, 78; R. 385 at 62, 67, 68, 70, 165, 169, 178-
79) . 
The only area of significant dispute between the parties was 
the inference to be gleaned from two shell casings found on the 
roadway after the shooting had occurred and the truck had sped 
away. Based on the testimony of a Salt Lake City police homicide 
detective and a Utah Highway Patrol metro gang unit officer, the 
State argued that the position of the casings indicated that 
defendant had shot the weapon out of the right front passenger 
side window (R. 386: 67-71). This conclusion was bolstered by 
the inference that Thornwall, who was right-handed, could not 
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have fired the shots, especially with such accurac '.,v^ i^  
, = i r IIL! L1 t aneoi is J y steering LUC LJ_ > *l '" hi f t i n •« its gears,. and then 
speeding awa; T~ contrast, defendant argued, based eu he same 
testimony ab^ ' •">•'- . -*^t -• ' * hhp ->bpll .-risings, that Russell 
Thornwa 11 ;^^ urea * . . e ^  j., : S:ii :i = :ii ri :i : w 
(Id. at 1 00-03) . 
T 1 I e i) i I t c c: HI u B : • f 11: :i :i s • • :: a s € 11: l < = i l t: l :i :i : i = :i i I : t • : • i I 1 1 < * 
sufficiency of the evidence, to which a morion for directed 
v~: i • Y • - r n - : .--ssed, * on the weight ur * k " ~hvsical 
evidence, including which interpretation of that evidence the 
4
":"Y found most plausible. The trial court emphasized this 
distinction, stating: 
If there was sufficient evidence • o proceed 
forward after the State had rested and after 
the case in its entirety had been presented 
and before submitting it to the jury, then 
•that's the only issue I decide, the basic 
sufficiency of the evidence. Whether the 
jury finds one witness more persuasive than 
another or whether it chooses to believe some 
evidence or ignore other evidence that they 
do not find persuasive 4 ~ *-u~ ----'<-> o ^ i ^ 
prerogative. 
If you wai it me to be the finder • if fact, 
don't try [the case] to the jury, But the 
defendant has a constitutional right to a 
jury and so does the State, and both parties 
are entitled to have the matter weighed by 
eight impartial folks. And that's what 
happened i n this case. 
I cannot say that there was not enough 
evidence to send this matter to the jury 
e : *•u r^ at the conclusion of the State' c 
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or at the conclusion of all of the evidence 
in the case. There was sufficient evidence 
to allow the jury to make that determination. 
(R. 387 at 38-39 or addendum A). 
In sum, the State established a prima facie case against 
defendant by producing evidence which, along with its reasonable 
inferences, could provide the basis for finding that defendant 
was the shooter. A jury acting fairly and reasonably could find 
the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, fl 13, 20 P.3d 300 (citations omitted) 
(articulating standard for prevailing on a directed verdict 
motion). Accordingly, the trial court did not err in submitting 
the case to the jury for a final determination of defendant's 
guilt or innocence. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of criminal homicide and two counts of 
attempted criminal homicide. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /6 day of January, 2003. 
MARK SHURTLEFF 
General 
SLOTNIK ' 
Assistant Attorney General 
torney 
JOANNE C 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
Addendum A 
First off/ with regard to the notice, I'm satisfied 
there was adequate notice. And if there wasn't, there was no 
objection, no objection on the record. 
What happens in chambers, we talk in there casually. 
We talk about a lot of things. And if we're going to start 
trying to reconstruct that when it's not on the record, then 
we are all going to have to take a different approach to how 
we try cases. But in any event, it was not on the record and 
didn't happen. That's the way it is. 
But I'm satisfied with the State's position that 
there was adequate notice. This potential theory of party 
liability on Mr. Mbntoya, the fact of the matter is, in any 
event, the State never really pursued that. And the defense 
put on its case saying that someone else was the shooter, at 
least made that inference during cross examination and all of 
the other things that went on. And I guess the jury didn't 
buy it. So in any event, adequate notice was there. 
With regard to the Motion to Dismiss both at the 
end of the State's case and at the end of the case in its 
entirety, regardless of my opinion on the state of the 
evidence as far as its weight, regardless of my opinion on 
whether the jury was right or wrong in this case — and I 
don't offer an opinion. I think I have already said when the 
motions were argued initially that I had concerns about the 
level of the weight that the State's evidence offered — but 
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Ifm not the fact-finder; the jury was — so what I think about 
the weight of the evidence is totally immaterial unless the 
jury verdict is a based upon nothing. If that's the case, I 
wouldn't have sent it to the jury in the first place. 
I absolutely refuse to become a trier of fact in a 
jury case. That's not my role and it is not my role to 
second-guess the jury. If there was sufficient evidence to 
proceed forward after the State had rested and after the case 
in its entirety had been presented and before submitting it to 
the jury, then that's the only issue I decide, the basic 
sufficiency of the evidence. Whether the jury finds one 
witness more persuasive than another or whether it chooses to 
believe some evidence or ignore other evidence that they do 
not find persuasive is the jury's sole prerogative. 
And that's what happened in this case. There was 
sufficient evidence to go to a jury on this matter, and the 
jury chose to believe certain pieces of evidence that they 
believe constituted proof beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Mr. Montoya fired the weapon. And while I may have had some 
concerns about whether or not the weight of the evidence was 
enough to constitute reasonable doubt, again I have to 
emphasize, that's not my role; it's not my role. 
If you want me to be the finder of fact, don't try 
them to the jury. But the defendant has a constitutional 
right to a jury and so does the State, and both parties are 
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entitled to have the matter weighed by eight impartial folks. 
And that's what happened in this case. 
I cannot say that there was not enough evidence to 
send this matter to the jury either at the conclusion of the 
State's case or at the conclusion of all of the evidence in 
the case. There was sufficient evidence to allow the jury to 
make that determination. 
It would have been better if we had somebody that 
said Mr. Montoya fired the gun, or Mr. Montoya didn't fire the 
gun. Well, sure. But circumstantial evidence is a reasonable 
method of proof, and that's what this case was. As far as who 
actually fired the weapon, it was a circumstantial case. 
And as you look at the evidence, particularly in the 
view of the way the State chooses to present it, it's just as 
logical, if not more logical, that Mr. Montoya fired the 
weapon as Mr. Thornwall. So I can't dismiss this case nor can 
I grant the directed verdict on the state of the evidence, and 
I decline to do so. The motion is denied in its entirety. 
Let the State prepare an appropriate order, please. 
MR. CASTLE: The State will, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. We'll be in recess. 
(These proceedings concluded at 10:10 a.m.) 
* • * 
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Addendum B 
Addendum B 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
MAR 0 8 2001 
Jtfmm Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE 8TATB OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FETE VICTOR MONTOYA, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE MO. 991910580 
Before the Court is the defendant's Motion for New Trial. 
Counsel for the State and counsel for the defendant appeared on 
February 26, 2001, for an evidentiary hearing and to argue their 
respective positions. Following oral argument, the Court took the 
matter under advisement to further consider the law in light of the 
facts adduced at the hearing. Since taking the Motion under 
advisement, the Court has had an opportunity to consider the law, 
all relevant pleadings, facts and the oral argument in this case. 
Being fully advised, the Court enters the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
LB9AL MfMrYffH 
The defendant has moved for a new trial on the basis that 
information provided by Jason Thornwall and a confidential 
informant constitutes newly discovered evidence. The recent Utah 
Supreme Court case of State v. Loose. 994 P.2d 1237, 1242 (Utah 
STATE V. MONTOYA PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
2000), reiterated "[t]he legal elements for analyzing a claim for 
a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. . . .: the moving 
party must demonstrate from the proffered evidence that: (i) it 
could not, with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and 
produced at the trial; (ii) it is not merely cumulative; and (iii) 
it must make a different result probable at retrial." 
The Court concludes that the defendant has failed to establish 
the first and third of these elements because the defense could 
have discovered the evidence with reasonable diligence before trial 
and the evidence would not produce a different result at retrial 
because it is inadmissible hearsay. Turning first to the diligence 
element, the Court agrees with the State that the defense had a 
number of options in pursuing the discovery of the confidential 
informant and Mr* Thornwall, but failed to exercise them. The 
defense could have easily obtained more time. The defendant merely 
had to agree to the State's request for a continuance. Instead, 
the defendant vehemently opposed the State's request, despite the 
fact that he could have used that time to continue investigating 
the whereabouts of the confidential informant or to further 
interview members of Russell Thornwall's family, including Jason 
Thornwall. The defense now contends that a continuance would have 
been futile because every avenue of investigation had been 
explored• To the contrary, the Court is persuaded that with 
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respect to the confidential informant, the defense could have 
sought the Court's assistance in compelling the informant's mother, 
who apparently knew his whereabouts, to be deposed under oath. 
Moreover, Jason Thornwall, Russell Thornwallvs only sibling, would 
have been a natural source of investigation, particularly in light 
of the information divulged by Natalie Thornwall, Jason Thornwall 
testified that he was easily accessible through his family members, 
who knew him as a confidant to his brother. Therefore, through 
reasonable diligence and acquiescing in the State's request for a 
continuance, the defendant could have discovered and sought 
production of Jason Thornwallfs and the confidential informant's 
statements. 
However, even if the defendant had discovered these statements 
prior to trial, the Court concludes that they are inadmissible 
hearsay and would therefore not have affected the outcome of the 
trial. Defense counsel argued at the hearing that the 
confidential informant would likely invoke his right to silence if 
called at trial. According to the defense, he would therefore 
become "unavailable* under Utah Rule of Evidence 804 and his prior 
statements to Mr. Couch would come in as "statements against 
interest" because those statements would place him in the passenger 
seat of the truck, thought by the State to be occupied by the 
shooter. However, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. White. 671 
STATE V. MONTOYA PAGE 4 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
P.2d 191 (Utah 1983), pointed out that only when a witness has 
personally asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege under oath would 
he be considered "unavailable." Since the confidential informant 
has not done so in this case, he cannot legally be considered 
unavailable. Moreover, the confidential informant's statement that 
he was in the front passenger seat is not truly a statement against 
interest because it does not admit anything, i.e., actually being 
the shooter. Furthermore, as the State points out, since this 
statement is made under the shroud of anonymity, the confidential 
informant cannot be subjected to criminal liability because of his 
statement. Finally, the defendant has not produced any evidence 
that would corroborate the confidential informant's statement. 
Similarly, the Court concludes that although Russell 
Thornwall's statement to his brother could be construed as a 
statement against interest, the statement is nevertheless 
inadmissible because the defendant has not offered any evidence 
that would corroborate the trustworthiness of the statement. To 
the contrary^ Jason Thornwall's delay in reporting his brother's 
statement to the police after his brother's death makes the 
statement suspect. Specifically, while Jason may have felt 
prohibited from going to the police with incriminating information 
about his brother, this prohibition clearly lifted with Russell 
Thornwall's death. Furthermore, despite his acknowledged belief 
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that an individual should not suffer for someone else's misdeeds, 
Jason Thornwall remained silent while the defendant, his apparent 
friend and an individual for whom he felt loyalty, was convicted 
and sent to prison. Because of these factors, Jason Thornwallfs 
testimony clouds Russell Thornwallvs alleged statement with the 
indicia of untrustworthiness. Accordingly, neither Jason 
Thornwallfs nor the confidential informant's statements would have 
been admissible at trial and would therefore not have affected the 
outcome of the trial. The defendant's Jtotion is denied. 
Counsel for the State is to prepare and submit a detailed 
Order in conformity with this Memorandum Decision. 
Dated this o day of March,/ 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
PETE VICTOR MONTOYA, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
REGARDING DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR NEWTRIAL 
CaseNo.991910580FS 
Hon. Timothy R. Hanson 
The Court having presided over a jury trial and motion for new trial in this case, 
hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS 
1. On November 14,2000, a jury found the defendant, Pete Victor Montoya, 
guilty of one count of Criminal Homicide, a first degree felony and two counts of 
Attempted Criminal Homicide, second degree felonies. 
2. On January 12,2001, the defendant was sentenced to five years to life for the 
Criminal Homicide and one to fifteen years for each Attempted Criminal Homicide 
count. Each count was issued consecutive to one another and an additional one year 
consecutive was attached to each count for the use of a dangerous weapon. 
3. Defendant moved this Court for a new trial on the basis that information 
provided by Jason Thornwall and a confidential informant constituted newly discovered 
evidence. A hearing, on the motion for new trial, was held on February 26, 2001. Defense 
T>S1 
counsel presented testimonial evidence and the Court listened to oral argument from both 
parties. 
4. Defense counsel presented the testimony of Jason Thornwall, the brother of 
deceased co-defendant Russell Thornwall, and Dennis Couch, a Salt Lake Legal 
Defender investigator. Jason Thornwall was questioned regarding exculpatory statements 
allegedly made by the co-defendant, Russell Thornwall, to Jason Thornwall. Although 
Jason Thornwall had this information at the time of the defendant's trial, he did not report 
this to the police or any other individual until forty-five days after the defendant's 
conviction. 
5. Jason Thornwall testified that he did not initially report this information 
because it incriminated his brother Russell Thornwall. Jason Thornwall further testified 
that after his brother committed suicide he did not report these statements to any police 
officer despite the fact that the defendant was his friend, that he was loyal to the 
defendant and the fact that he held the belief that an individual should not suffer for some 
else's misdeeds. 
6. Jason Thornwall offered no corroborating evidence of this alleged exculpatory 
conversation, nor could he state when the conversation took place other than it occurred 
sometime prior to Russell Thornwall's wedding. 
7. Jason Thornwall also testified that he was easily accessible through his family 
members who knew him as a confidant to his brother Russell. 
8. Dennis Couch, an investigator with the Salt Lake Legal Defenders office, 
testified that he interviewed a confidential informant who indicated that he was at the 
scene of the shooting in the front passenger seat of the truck where the shots were fired. 
9. Mr. Couch would not disclose the name of the confidential informant as 
defense counsel and Mr. Couch promised the informant anonymity. 
10. At the conclusion of the hearing the Court took defendant's motion under 
advisement, to weigh the evidence and to consider the law. 
3ST 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based upon the memorandum of the parties, the arguments of counsel and 
good cause appearing, the Court makes the following findings: 
1. This Court finds that the Utah Supreme Court decision in State v. Loose, 994 
P.2d 1237 (Utah 2000), is controlling in the area of newly discovered evidence. The 
Court sets forth the "legal elements for analyzing a claim for newly discovered evidence . 
. . . : the moving party must demonstrate from the proffered evidence that: (i) it could not, 
with reasonable diligence, have been discovered and produced at trial; (ii) it is not merely 
cumulative; and (iii) it must make a different result probable at retrial Id, at 1241. 
2. This Court finds that the defendant has failed to establish the first 
element of reasonable diligence and the third element that this evidence would produce a 
different result at retrial because the evidence in inadmissible hearsay. 
3. The defendant possessed a number of options in pursuing the discovery 
of the confidential informant, as well as, Jason Thornwall, but chose not to exercise those 
options. The defense could have easily sought a continuance of the matter especially in 
light of the fact that the state requested a continuance, yet the defendant concluded it was 
in his best interest to go forward with the trial and thereby opposed the state's motion. 
4. The defendant could have sought the assistance of this Court in 
compelling the confidential informant's mother, who knew of the confidential 
informant's whereabouts, to be deposed under oath. 
5. The Court concludes that Jason Thornwall, Russell Thornwall's sibling 
and confidant, was a natural source of investigation, particular in light of the additional 
information provided by Natalie Thornwall. Jason Thornwall admitted that he was easily 
accessible through his family members and could have been discovered prior to trial. 
6. Therefore, through reasonable diligence the defendant could have 
discovered and produced the statements of the confidential informant and Jason 
Thornwall. 
7. Additionally, the evidence offered by the defendant would not affect 
the outcome of the trial because it is inadmissible hearsay. In particular the confidential 
informant's testimony does not fall into the hearsay exception as an "unavailable" 
witness, pursuant to Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 804, nor does the statement arise to the 
level of a "statement against interest," as the defendant has argued. The confidential 
informant failed to personally asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege, against self 
incrimination, under oath, as required by State v. White. 671 P.2d 91 (Utah 1983), and 
therefore cannot be considered "unavailable." 
8. The confidential informant's statement, that he was the front seat 
passenger, is not a statement against interest, as it does not admit to incriminating 
conduct. Moreover, since the statement has been made under a blanket of anonymity, he 
is not subject to criminal liability. Finally the defendant failed to produce any evidence 
that would corroborate the confidential informant's statement. 
9. Likewise, the defendant has failed to offer any evidence that would 
corroborate the trustworthiness of Jason Thornwall's statement regarding Russell 
Thornwall's admissions to him. Although the alleged statement may be considered a 
"statement against interest," the delay in reporting his brother's statement to the police, 
after his brother's death, makes such a statement suspect. While Jason Thornwall may 
have felt prohibited from going to the police with incriminating information about his 
brother, this prohibition clearly lifted with the death of Russell Thornwall. Furthermore, 
despite Jason Thornwall's acknowledged belief that an individual should not suffer for 
someone else's misdeeds, Jason Thornwall remained silent while the defendant, his 
friend and an individual for whom he felt loyalty, was convicted and sent to prison. 
Therefore, Jason Thornwall's testimony is untrustworthy. 
10. Accordingly, the confidential informant's statement as well as Jason 
Thomwall's statement is inadmissible hearsay and would therefore have no affect on the 
outcome of the trial. 
Based upon the foregoing, it is HEREBY ORDERED that/the Defendant's 
Motion for New Trial is denied 
DATED this J § _ day of May 2001. 
BY7HECQI 
Approved as to form: 
Robin K/fjunefe&rg 
Attorney for^ tne defendant 
